This paper provides evidence of a correlation between licensing exam di¢ culty and salaries in a regulated profession. Exam di¢ culty is positively correlated with salaries across states and over time, both at the aggregate and individual state levels. The magnitude of this correlation is substantial: a one percent increase in exam di¢ culty implies a 1.7 percent increase in median entry-level salaries.
Introduction
Entry into many professions requires that applicants obtain approval from state licensing boards and demonstrate a certain level of competence. Such professions include lawyers, accountants, auditors, teachers, nurses, engineers, psychologists, barbers and hairdressers.
According to Kleiner (2000) , more than 800 occupations are licensed in at least one US state. Professional licensing directly a¤ects 29 percent of US workers, more than those a¤ected by either minimum wage or unionization. The main requirement to enter a regulated profession is usually that of passing a licensing examination. This paper explores the link between licensing exam di¢ culty and entry-level salaries.
While the existence of such a relationship is generally accepted in the literature, there is no direct evidence as to whether greater licensing exam di¢ culty a¤ects entry salaries.
Establishing such an e¤ect is not an easy task. While licensing boards can and do adjust exam di¢ culty, their behavior is not generally observable to the researcher. The bar exam, instead, lends itself particularly well to the task. Therefore, the focus chosen for the present study was the US market for lawyers. Detailed analysis of the grading procedures and structure of the bar exam reveals that, while its structure went unchanged in the states and over the years considered, the di¢ culty of the exam varied considerably.
In fact, accurate data is available on exam di¢ culty and reveals large discrepancies in exam di¢ culty across states and over time. Just to cite one example: if Alabama were to adopt the standard required in California, the pass rate would drop from 79% to 39%, even if candidate ability were held constant. 1 Several empirical observations suggest a correlation between exam di¢ culty and entry salaries in the legal profession. First, states with more di¢ cult exams tend to have higher salaries. Second, the average exam di¢ culty signi…cantly increased during the 1990s, as did salaries. Third, within states, increases in exam di¢ culty correlate signi…cantly with increases in salaries, and the data suggest that the impact of increases in exam di¢ culty on salaries can be sizeable. A one percent increase in di¢ culty implies an increase in salaries of around 1.7 percent. I also study how changes in exam di¢ culty a¤ect the 25 th and the 75 th percentiles of the salary distribution. While there is some weak evidence that di¢ culty has a positive impact on the tails of salary distribution, the median salary seems to be more responsive to changes in di¢ culty than the two quartiles, suggesting a possible compression of salary distribution for relatively high salaries. I …nd no evidence that increases in di¢ culty reduce the interquartile di¤erence of salary distribution.
Related literature
Although the stringency of entry requirements is the key variable determined by licensing boards, there is surprisingly little empirical research on the impact of variations in exam di¢ culty. In one of the early contributions to the literature on licensing, Maurizi (1974) used pass rates as a measure of licensing requirements, but did not take into consideration that pass rates depend on candidate ability as well as on exam di¢ culty. Le-er (1978) attempts to overcome this problem by developing a proxy for licensing di¢ culty in the market for physicians, although he does not relate it to salaries in the profession.
Since candidates can take either a state or a national examination, the percent of candidates choosing the state exam is used to develop a proxy for state exam di¢ culty. While this is a signi…cant step forward in measuring the stringency of entry requirements, the indirect procedure makes the proxy very imprecise.
A related stream of literature has focused on the impact of licensing on wages and on the quality of professional services (Shepard 1978 , HaasWilson 1986 , Kleiner and Kudrle 2000 , Kugler and Sauer 2005 , but there is no direct evidence concerning the impact of exam di¢ culty on salaries. Existing studies compare licensed and non-licensed professions, or a single profession before and after a change in licensing regulation, or across states with di¤erent types of regulation. This paper takes a di¤erent tack, describing the impact of changes in exam di¢ culty on salaries while holding the overall regulatory framework constant.
2 Brief overview of the bar exam and the data Essay and case questions are set by state boards and graded at the state level, according to criteria set by each board. 4 In this case, a particular score does not necessarily correspond to a standard level of performance across states and years. However, most states have also introduced essay score scaling. The most common scaling procedure is mean and variance scaling. Mean and variance scaling requires that each essay score be transformed so that the mean and variance of the distribution of scaled essay scores is equal to the mean and variance of the standardized test scores. Consequently, the scaled essay scores are not a¤ected by exam-speci…c unobserved di¤erences in exam di¢ culty or in the severity of grading procedures (Crocker and Algina 1986, Linn 1993 Professional Test) . When this is the case, the Conference provides state boards with possible exam questions and some analysis of the issues involved in each question in order to facilitate grading. Even when using this service, state boards grade the answers independently, using locally-set standards. 5 An alternative scaling procedure is quantile by quantile equating. The results of the two techniques are not necessarily identical, but di¤erences are empirically small (see Lenel 1992). overall scores (the weighted average of the standardized test and essay test score) thus share the same metric across states and years, and can be compared. Since the pass-fail decision is based on overall scores, the observed minimum quality standards for each state share a common metric and provide a simple measure for exam di¢ culty. (In the rest of the paper, I will refer to the overall minimum quality standard as exam di¢ culty, or the minimum standard). 6 Data on minimum standards is available from either 1984 or from the introduction of comparable standards (reported in Table 1 , Column 1), whichever is later, to 2005. Table 1 , Column 2 reports any changes in the minimum quality standards, while Column 3 reports the corresponding date of each change. Column 4 reports the minimum quality standard in the last year of the sample. With this information, the table has all of the data necessary for reconstructing the time series of the minimum standard in each state.
Standards di¤er signi…cantly across both states and years. 7 Minimum quality standard data is matched with data on entry-level salaries in law …rms. The National Association for Law Placement surveys law school graduates yearly and collects data on the quartiles of the distribution of entry salaries. 8 Figure 1 reports the exam di¢ culty and entry salary for observations in the sample. The slope of the …tted line is 1.1, corresponding to a $1,100 increase in salary for an increase 6 The weights given to the two exam components may vary across states. Empirically, the weight given to the standardized test varies between 50 percent and 65 percent. For realistic distribution of scores and standards, however, these di¤erences do not a¤ect the comparability of minimum standards. 7 The main source of standard and grading procedure data is The Comprehensive Guide to Bar Admission Requirements, published annually by the American Bar Association and the National Conference of Bar Examiners. This source is complemented by information from various issues of The Bar Examiner, published by the National Conference of Bar Examiners (NCBEX). When standards are comparable, but not expressed on a 0-200 point basis, the standards have been converted to a 0-200 basis to increase the consistency of Table 1. In the Comprehensive Guide there is some uncertainty as to when some standards changed. Wherever possible, additional sources have been used to pinpoint the exact date of change. In the few cases where no such data was available, the earliest date compatible with the information in the Comprehensive Guide was used. 
Empirical results

Regression analysis
I estimate regressions of the general form
where W i;t is the median entry salary in state i and year t; D i;t is the exam di¢ culty;
is a continuous state-speci…c function of time t, measured in years; u i;t is the idiosyncratic error term, which is allowed to be heteroscedastic and autocorrelated across observations within a state. The identi…cation strategy is based on the assumption that any unobserved variable correlated with both exam di¢ culty and entry salaries varies smoothly over time, so that it is captured by the continuous function g i (t). For example, changes in demand for legal services, or the stock of licensed lawyers within a state, are likely to follow long-term trends, and may thus be reasonably captured by g i (t). Changes in exam di¢ culty are discrete, and the exact dates of the changes in standard are known. So the parameter is identi…ed because of the discontinuities in exam di¢ culty (the regression discontinuity approach goes back to Thistlethwaite and Campbell 1960, and Campbell 1969) . Since the determinants of the di¢ culty of the bar examination are not well understood, it is di¢ cult to judge whether this assumption holds in practice. However, changes in standards are infrequent, so the relevant omitted variables are more likely to be longterm trends in demographics or market characteristics than short-term shocks. In any case, the estimated parameter is still pertinent as a descriptive result of the correlation between exam di¢ culty and entry salaries. Table 3 reports OLS estimates of model (1) with alternative speci…cations for g i (t).
In column 1, the function g i (t) is a constant, so the coe¢ cient captures the overall correlation between exam di¢ culty and salaries in the sample. The impact of exam di¢ culty in column 1 is simply the slope of the …tted line in Figure 1 . In column 2, g i (t) = k i , so that the coe¢ cient captures the within-state correlation between exam di¢ culty and salaries. 9 In column 3, g i (t) = k 1i + k 2i t, so that the coe¢ cient captures the within-state correlation between exam di¢ culty and salaries, after controlling for a linear, state-speci…c trend. Finally, in column 4, g i (t) = k 1i + k 2i t + k 3i t 2 , so that salaries are allowed to follow a quadratic, state-speci…c trend.
The impact of exam di¢ culty is positive and signi…cantly di¤erent from zero at conventional levels in all speci…cations (the standard errors are clustered by state). In spite of the signi…cant heterogeneity across states, there are no statistical di¤erences between the pooled estimator in column 1 and the other estimates in columns 2-4. The magnitude of the impact of exam di¢ cult is sizeable. An increase of one on the MBE scale implies a $1,000 increase in entry salaries. In relative terms, a one percent increase in di¢ culty implies an increase in salaries of around 1.7 percent. 10 9 The number of observations is smaller because I use only data for states in which at least one change in standards occur within the sample period. Tables 4 and 5 . The speci…cation used in each column is the same as that used in the corresponding column in Table 3 . In Tables 4 and 5 , columns 1 and 2, the impact of exam di¢ culty is positive and signi…cant, suggesting a positive correlation both in the pooled sample and within-states.
The magnitude of the impact on the 75 th percentile is similar to that on the median, while the impact on the 25 th percentile is signi…cantly lower. After controlling for linear and quadratic trends in columns 3 and 4, the impact of di¢ culty is still positive but substantially smaller, signi…cantly di¤erent from zero for the 25 th percentile, but not for the 75 th . Overall, there is some weak evidence of a positive impact of di¢ culty on the tails of the salary distribution.
In Table 5 , the dependent variable is the interquartile di¤erence in salaries. There is no sign of a decrease in interquartile variability in salaries as exam di¢ culty increases.
If anything, the results in column 2 suggest a possible slight increase in the interquartile di¤erence. The results in Tables 3 and 5 , however, suggest that the median and 75 th percentile get closer as a result of increased exam di¢ culty.
What leads to the positive impact of exam di¢ culty on salaries?
Bar exam di¢ culty can a¤ect salaries in the legal market in two ways. First, if the pool of exam candidates is held constant, higher standards imply that the number of successful candidates will decrease, because fewer candidates will meet the higher standard. Assuming that there is a downward sloping demand for entry-level lawyers, this implies that entry salaries will increase (this is the quantity e¤ect of higher standards).
Second, higher standards imply that the minimum -and the median-bar exam score of successful candidates is higher. If bar exam scores are correlated with the quality of entry-level lawyers as perceived by the market, then higher scores imply higher salaries (this is the quality e¤ect of higher standards). These two mechanisms promote salary increases, so the observed impact of exam di¢ culty on salaries is not informative of the potential underlying mechanism causing exam di¢ culty to a¤ect salaries.
However, the quality mechanism has another implication. Since candidates with the highest bar exam performances are not a¤ected by increases in di¢ culty (they pass no matter what the minimum score is), increases in exam di¢ culty imply decreases in the variability of successful candidates'bar exam scores. If bar exam scores are correlated with the quality of entry-level lawyers as perceived by the market, then relatively low salaries should increase more than relatively high salaries. The evidence in Table 5 casts some doubts on the empirical relevance of the quality e¤ect. The impact on the 25 th percentile is lower than the impact on the median, and is not signi…cantly di¤erent from that on the 75 th percentile. Increases in di¢ culty may be associated with some compression of the salary distribution, but this does not seem to be driven by increases in relatively low salaries. It may simply be that exam scores are weakly correlated with quality, as perceived by employers. In fact, whether the bar exam actually increases the quality of lawyers is a topic of debate (see, for example, the Society of American Law Teachers 2002).
Conclusions
Professional licensing is one of the most important labor market institutions today, yet the actual behavior of licensing boards is rarely taken into exam owing to the lack of data and the complexity of the licensing requirements. This paper is the …rst attempt to study the link between exam di¢ culty and salaries in a regulated profession. The existence of such a relationship has a number of potentially important implications. First, even if the overall regulation of the profession is unchanged, licensing boards may signi…cantly a¤ect labor market outcomes by changing exam di¢ culty. Second, from a policy perspective, this paper suggests that the available data may be used to provide an estimate of the impact of proposed changes in exam di¢ culty on salaries. It is somewhat surprising that public discussion of this important issue rarely takes place before changes are made in licensing exam di¢ culty.
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